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Case No. 20160646-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
SOUTH SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
S. STEVEN MAESE,
Defendant/Appellant.
Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) and §78A-7-118(8), the Court of Appeals
has jurisdiction over this matter insofar as it relates to the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. §
77-1-6(2)(e) because a district court ruling regarding the constitutionality of a statute on appeal
from justice court is an appealable decision.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 10, 2013, in the City of South Salt Lake, Utah Highway Patrolman Roger
Griffis observed the appellant, Santiago Steven Maese, cross the double white lane of the HOV
lane on I-15.1 Trooper Griffis then observed Mr. Maese cross several lanes of traffic while
failing to signal for at least 2 seconds.2 Mr. Maese was subsequently charged with infractions

1

R. at 32.
Id.

2

4

and denied a jury trial on the charges.3 He was convicted of both charges at a bench trial on
January 6, 2015.4 Mr. Maese filed an appeal for a trial de novo in district court where he again
moved for a jury trial and was denied.5 He was again convicted of both charges at a bench trial
in the District Court.6

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules that are of central importance for the
issues raised in this appeal include the following:
Constitutional Provisions
UTAH CONST. art I, §10
UTAH CONST. art I, §12
Statutes
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-1-6(2)(e): “No person shall be convicted unless
by verdict of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment
of a court when trial by jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon
a judgment by a magistrate.”
Rules

3

R. at 2.
R. at 4.
5
R. at 38-39, 57, 61-63.
6
R. at 164-65.
4

5

UTAH R. CRIM. P. 17(d): “…No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an
infraction.”

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-1-6(2)(e) is valid under the Utah Constitution because the Utah
Constitution does not guarantee the right to a trial by jury in all cases. Utah courts interpreting
the right to trial by jury under the Utah Constitution have placed some limits on that right. The
right to a trial by jury only extends to those actions that were cognizable at law at the time the
Utah Constitution was adopted. Because neither infractions nor traffic violations existed at the
time of the Utah Constitution’s adoption, those actions were not cognizable at law and fall
outside of the purview of the right to trial by jury.
Additionally, statutes carry with them a presumption of constitutionality. Current Utah
interpretations of the right to trial by jury provide a reasonable basis for a constitutional
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6(2)(e).

ARGUMENT
I.

The Court does not have jurisdiction over the separation of powers issue raised
by Mr. Maese, as the Court has already ruled in this case.
Pursuant to the Utah Code, decisions by the district court on appeals from justice court

are final unless the district court rules on the constitutionality of a statute.7
Here, Mr. Maese questions the constitutionality of a prosecutor’s ability to amend a
misdemeanor charge to an infraction. According to the prior order issued by this court in this

7

UTAH CODE ANN. §78A-7-118(8).

6

case, the issue challenges a prosecutorial practice, not a statute.8 Relying on the court’s ruling
already made on the issue in this case, this court lacks jurisdiction on the issue and the need to
further brief it is mute.
II.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(2)(e) does not violate the Utah Constitution because the
Utah Constitution makes no guarantee that defendants charged with infractions
have the right to a trial by jury.
The Utah Supreme Court has limited the right to trial by jury in various instances. An

analysis of historical context and traditions from the period of the adoption of the Constitution
provide no insight into how infractions should be treated because no such classification of
offense existed at the time. Current case law interpreting the right to trial by jury in this context
has not been applied to criminal or infraction cases, but it has narrowed the right to trial by jury
to actions cognizable at the time the Utah Constitution was adopted.
Furthermore, as applied to this case, Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6(2)(e) can be reasonably
interpreted to be constitutional in light of modern Utah cases interpreting the relevant sections of
the Utah Constitution , as well as under a due process analysis. Therefore, both Utah Code Ann.
§§77-1-6(2)(e) and Rule 17(d) of the Utah rules of Criminal Procedure should be held to be
constitutional.
A. The Utah Constitution does not preserve the right to trial by jury for infractions
because prosecuting an infraction was not an action cognizable at law when the
Utah Constitution was adopted.
The Utah Constitution merely preserves the right to a trial by jury as the right existed at
the time of its adoption.9 In International Harvester, the Utah Supreme Court held that article I,

8

South Salt Lake City v. Maese, No. 20160646- CA (Utah Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2017)(order deferring judgment on
motion to dismiss), attached as Exhibit B.
9
See International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor and Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418, 419 (Utah 1981).
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section 10 of the Utah Constitution guaranteed the right to trial by jury in civil cases.10
However, the court also reasoned that the language of article I, section 10, “discloses a virtually
unanimous intention on the part of the framers of the Constitution to preserve a constitutional
right to trial by jury….”11
Because the right to trial by jury is only preserved by the Utah Constitution, the right
must be extended only to actions that were so triable at the time of its adoption.12 Several years
after International Harvester, the Utah Supreme Court further expounded on this holding in
Hyatt v. Hill, when it held that the “constitutional right to a trial by jury is preserved and
currently exists only in actions so triable when the constitution was adopted.”13 Hyatt was a
paternity case in which a putative father filed a jury demand which was denied by the trial
court.14 The Utah Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that there was no remedy under the
common law at the time the Utah Constitution was adopted “to compel a putative father to
contribute to the support his illegitimate offspring.”15
Actions were only triable by jury at the time the Utah Constitution was adopted if they
were cognizable at law. The Utah Supreme Court further affirmed the Hyatt standard in Zions
First National Bank v. Rocky Mountain Irrigation, Inc.,16 stating that, “we made it clear that this
constitutional right to a jury trial in civil cases extends only to cases that would have been
cognizable at law at the time the constitution was adopted.”17 Recently, in Simler v. Chilel, 18 the

10

Id. at 421.
Id. at 419 (Emphasis added).
12
Hyatt v. Hill, 714 P.2d 299, 300-01 (Utah 1986).
13
Id.
14
Id. at 300.
15
Id. at 301.
16
795 P.2d 658 (Utah 1990).
17
Id. at 661.
18
379 2016 UT 23, 379 P.3d 1195.
11
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Utah Supreme Court held that the Utah Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in a small
claims trial de novo, because such claims were cognizable at law when the Utah Constitution
was adopted.19 The court reasoned that Utah Revised Statutes of 1898 “contained numerous
provisions discussing a defendant’s demand for a jury in justice courts.”20
In the instant case, Mr. Maese attacks the constitutional validity of Utah Code Ann. §771-6(2)(e) on the grounds that he was denied a jury trial for two infractions. The classification of
a violation of law as an infraction, however, did not exist at the time the Utah Constitution was
adopted.
The 1898 Revised Statutes of Utah classify offenses as either felonies or misdemeanors.21
At the time, both of these classifications carried with them the possibility of jail time or
imprisonment.22 The same remains true of misdemeanors and felonies to this day.23 Lacking
from the 1898 Statutes, however, is any mention of offenses classified as infractions.24 Because
no such classification for an infraction existed, a prosecutor would not have been able to bring a
criminal action charged as an infraction at the time the Utah Constitution was adopted.
Mr. Maese wishes to frame this issue as merely one of semantics, but it is more than that.
Admittedly, in the 1898 code some actions did prescribe a punishment for a fine only,25 which on
the surface may lead some to believe that such crimes were in essence what we now call
infractions. However, Utah statutes at the time also provided that imprisonment at hard labor

19

Id. at ¶17.
Id. at ¶16.
21
1898 UTAH REV. STAT. §4062.
22
Id. at §§4063-4065.
23
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-203 and §76-3-204 and §76-3-301.
24
See 1898 UTAH REV. STAT. §4062.
25
See e.g. id at §4238. (Imposing a fine up to 25 dollars for performing unnecessary labor or business on Sunday.)
20

9

could be imposed until a fine was paid off at the rate of one dollar per day served.26

This

puts these offenses back squarely into our modern concept of a misdemeanor or felony, not an
infraction. Misdemeanors today are often punished only with a fine, and in such cases jail time
is only a possibility if necessary to enforce the terms of probation. For an infraction, however,
there is no possibility of jail time. Not even in instances where a defendant fails to pay the
sentenced fine.27 Any attempt to substitute jail time for fine payment on an infraction would
violate the Utah Code.
Mr. Maese attempts to broaden this issue beyond what is actually before the court by
insisting that the statute in question here is invalid because the right to trial by jury for petty
offenses is protected under the Utah Constitution. The issue here, however, is not whether all
petty offenses have the right to trial by jury, but whether defendants charged with infractions
have the right to such a trial. Under the statute and rule in question here, only infractions are
barred from a right to trial by jury.28
While Mr. Maese provides various examples of petty offenses being tried by a jury in
ages past, none of those examples are completely analogous to those offenses for which Mr.
Maese was denied a jury trial more recently. It is impossible to say that the framers of the Utah
Constitution would have expected someone charged with infractions arising from traffic
violations to be allowed an absolute right try such cases before a jury. Such actions were not
cognizable to the framers of the constitution because those actions did not exist.

26

Id. at §5155, attached as Exhibit A.
See UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18-8.
28
See UTAH CODE ANN. §77-1-6(2)(e); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 17(d).
27
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The prohibition of jail time on an infraction marks a material difference between modern
offenses classified as infractions, and misdemeanors as defined at the time of the Utah
Constitution’s adoption. Furthermore, violations of the traffic code did not exist at the time of
the Utah Constitution’s adoption. Because they did not exist, they were not cognizable at law.
Infractions were not triable before a jury then, and no such right is preserved by the Utah
Constitution now. Therefore, Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(2)(e) does not violate the Utah
Constitution.
B. Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6(2)(e) and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(d)
afford defendants due process.
Because infractions and traffic offenses did not exist at the time of the adoption of the Utah
Constitution, the practical concerns surrounding their prosecution could not have been
considered by the framers. This is best analyzed in the context of due process. The Utah
Supreme Court has reasoned:
… "due process" is not a technical concept with a fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances which can be imprisoned within the treacherous limits of
any formula. Rather the demands of due process rest on the concept of basic
fairness of procedure and demand a procedure appropriate to the case and just to
the parties involved.29
The Utah Supreme Court has given the following three factors to be balanced in any given
circumstances:
[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the functions involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.30

29
30

Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338, 341 (Utah 1980).
V-1 Oil Co. v. Dept. of Environmental Quality, 939 P.2d 1192, 1196 (Utah 1997).
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Here, the private interest at stake was relatively small. Mr. Maese was charged with two
infractions. Infractions carry a maximum fine of $750.31 Mr. Maese was ultimately fined a total
of $240 on the two infractions. Beyond the fine, there is no risk of jail time in infraction cases.
While these amounts are not negligible to most, the imposition of such judgments can only come
after the defendant is afforded a fair process of a bench trial.
The risk of erroneous deprivation here is low. Infraction cases typically involve relatively
simple fact patterns. The elements of the offenses lack complexity as well. The risk of a mistaken
verdict in an infraction case is substantially lower than that in serious crimes. Identity, and the act
itself are relatively simple to establish. In the case of traffic offenses, the officer often witnesses
the entire violation, and makes personal contact with the offender. Such was the case here.
In this case, the only additional safeguard that a jury trial would provide is a jury. All other
safeguards remain available in a bench trial. This is not a case where hundreds of items of evidence
along with hours of witness testimony must be analyzed to determine even the most fundamental
issues of a crime such as the identity of the defendant. If there had been reasonable doubt that Mr.
Maese was guilty of the offenses, it is unlikely that a jury would have been more capable of
discovering it than the judge.
While a jury provides virtually no additional protection to a defendant in an infraction case,
the burden it places on government and the public is significant. Jury trials require that the jurors
be compensated. In the case of justice courts, it may involve also paying additional time for the
judge, the court clerks, and prosecutors. There is significant additional cost because of the time
required to hold a jury trial, due to the practical considerations that must be made to seat a jury.

31

See UTAH CODE ANN. §§76-3-205(2) and 76-3-301(1)(e).
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To entitle a defendant to a jury trial in even the most minor of cases, infractions, would
be stepping well beyond the demands of due process and overly burdensome on the public. A
bench trial is sufficient in meeting the demands of due process for defendants charged with
infractions. In a bench trial, the burden remains on the prosecutor to prove all elements of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.32 The prosecutor must still comply with the rules of criminal
procedure, and the rules of evidence.33 Additionally, the defendant maintains his ability to
testify or not, to present witnesses and other evidence, and to confront and cross examine
witnesses.34 Compared to the relatively small stakes faced by a defendant in these cases, the
requirements in place in a bench trial maintain a substantial burden on the part of the prosecutor
to ensure that a defendant is afforded due process, while the defendant maintains all the other
rights he would be afforded if the case were tried by a jury.
C. Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6(2)(e) and Rule 17(d ) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure are constitutional because they can be reasonably interpreted as
such.
When statutes are challenged for constitutionality they carry a presumption of
constitutionality.35 Current precedent on the subject of the right to trial by jury for infractions
only examines the issue in light of the United States Constitution.36 Considering the current case
law available regarding the right to trial by jury in criminal matters as guaranteed under the US
Constitution, coupled with the rules set by the Utah Supreme Court with regard to the right to
trial by jury in civil cases as argued above, Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6(2)(e) and Rule 17(d) of the

32

UTAH CODE ANN. §76-1-501(1).
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 1(b); UTAH R. EVID. 1101(a).
34
UTAH CONST. art. I, §12
35
In the Matter of Criminal Investigation, 7th District Court No. CS-1, 754 P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988).
36
See e.g., West Valley City v. McDonald, 948 P.2d 371, 375 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
33
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure can be reasonably interpreted as constitutional under the Utah
Constitution.
When a statute is challenged based on constitutionality it is presumed to be valid and any
reasonable doubts are resolved in favor of constitutionality.37 In Greaves v. State38, the Utah
Supreme Court held that a challenged statute did not violate the constitution.39 The court
reasoned that statutes “should not be declared unconstitutional if there is any reasonable basis
upon which they can be found to come within the constitutional frame work….”40 The Utah
Supreme Court later clarified this rule in Society of Separationists v. Whitehead, when it restated
the standard as, “the act is presumed valid, and we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor
constitutionality.”41
The United State Supreme Court has interpreted the right to trial by jury to not to extend
to petty offenses under the federal constitution.42 Petty offenses are defined federally to be those
offenses that a legislature has determined to carry a maximum prison sentence of six months or
less.43 This court has followed this standard when reviewing Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6(2)(e) in
McDonald.44
The language of the Sixth Amendment of the US Constitution is as broad if not broader
than the analogous provisions of the Utah Constitution. The Sixth Amendment states, “In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an

37

Society of Separationists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993).
528 P.2d 805 (Utah 1974).
39
Id. at 806-07.
40
Id. at 807.
41
Society of Separationists, 870 P. 2d at 920.
42
See e.g., Lewis v. United States, 518 US 322, 325 (1996).
43
Id. at 328.
44
West Valley City v. McDonald, 948 P.2d 371, 375 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
38
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impartial jury…,”45 whereas the Utah Constitution does not include “all.”46 Despite plain
language that may suggest that any accused is guaranteed the right to a trial by jury under the US
Constitution in every circumstance, modern Sixth Amendment case law limits that right to
offenses carrying at least six months of possible incarceration. 47
This court has already held that Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6(2)(e) does not violate the
federal constitution.48 This begs the question: What language in the Utah Constitution justifies a
departure from that same reasoning with respect to the Utah Constitution? There is none.
The City does not contend that the Utah Constitution does not preserve the right to a jury
trial for some petty offenses. But petty offenses cover a wide range of offenses, with a wide
range of punishments. The only issue in this case is whether such a right should be extended to
the extreme low end of the range: infractions. Infractions and their punishments are substantially
less serious than other so called, “petty offenses.” Infractions cannot be punished with jail time.
The recommended fine amounts for infractions tend to be significantly lower than those for Class
B Misdemeanors (the other extreme end of the range).49
As discussed above, the Utah Constitution preserves the right to a trial by jury only as it
existed at the time it was adopted.50 Infractions, especially traffic offenses, the sheer volume at
which they are prosecuted in this state, and whether such offenses carry the right to trial by jury
were not considerations that could have been made by the framers of the Utah Constitution.
Because of this, historical context and the debates regarding the drafting of the Utah Constitution

45

U.S. CONST. amend. VI (Emphasis added).
UTAH CONST. art I, §§10, 12.
47
Lewis v. United States, 518 US 322, 326 (1996)(citing Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 56, 512 (1974)).
48
McDonald, 948 P.2d at 375.
49
See generally, STATE OF UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, UNIFORM FINE/BAIL SCHEDULE (2016).
50
See Hyatt v. Hill, 714 P.2d 299, 301 (Utah 1986).
46
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lack direct application to the facts of this case. It is reasonable to interpret Utah Code Ann. §771-6(2)(e) as coming within the constitutional framework because it applies only to actions that
were not cognizable at law at the time of adoption and because the standard is well within what
has been followed when interpreting the US Constitution, which contains broader more inclusive
language. Therefore, any reasonable doubt about the section’s validity should be resolved in
favor of constitutionality.

CONCLUSION
Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6(2)(e) and Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
are not unconstitutional under article I, sections 10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution. The City,
therefore, respectfully asks that the decision below be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted this 10th day of May, 2017.
/s/ Stephen K. Aina
Stephen K. Aina (14579)
Marcus Gilson (15142)
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
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EXHIBIT A:

EXHIBIT B

FILED

UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

JAN 3 0 2017
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
-ooOoo—

South Salt Lake City,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

ORDER

v.

Santiago Steven Maese,

Case No. 20160646-CA

Defendant and Appellant.

Before Judges Orme, Christiansen, and Pohlman.

This matter is before the court on South Salt Lake City's motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction. The underlying case originated in justice court. Pursuant to Utah
Code section 78A-7-118(8), appeals from justice court are limited to a trial de novo in
district court unless the district court rules on the constitutionality of a statute or
ordinance. The City argues that the district court did not rule on the constitutionality of
a statute, and, accordingly, this court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal.

Appellant Maese argues that the district court ruled on the constitutionality of
Utah Code section 77-l-6(2)(e), which provides that defendants charged with infractions
are not entitled to a jury trial.1 In his motion for a jury trial in the district court, Maese
put the issue of the constitutionality of the statute squarely before the district court.
However, there is nothing in the record that reflects the district court's ruling on the
matter. Maese failed to provide a transcript of the district court proceedings during
which the trial court apparently made its ruling. Maese requests to supplement the

1. Maese also asserts that the prosecution's practice of amending misdemeanor charges
down to infractions violates a constitutional provision regarding separation of powers.
Although framed as a constitutional issue, this challenge is to a prosecutorial practice
and not a statute. Accordingly, this issue does not come within the further appellate

jurisdiction provided in Utah Code § 78A-7-118(8). See Provo City v. Orvis, 2007UTApp
74,116.

